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Thompson: Water Law - Reusing Irrigation Waste Water on Different Lands: A

CASE NOTES
WATER LAW-Reusing Irrigation Waste Water on Different Lands: A Warning to Get a New Permit. Fuss v. Franks, 610 P.2d 17 (Wyo. 1980).

John Fuss farmed two adjacent tracts of land in the
Goshen Irrigation District (G.I.D.)--one of which he leased
from Myrtice Baumgartner, the other owned by himself.
These two adjacent tracts were joined on the north by lands
leased and farmed by William Franks. The Fuss and Baumgartner land received water directly from the G.I.D. canal
which ran along the south edge of their property. The Fuss
and Baumgartner land' irrigated from south to north and
therefore the water from these lands flowed toward the
Franks land.
A secondary highway ran north and south to the east
of these three tracts and bordered the Baumgartner and
Franks properties. There was a borrow pit along the west
side of the highway in the right-of-way. Fuss constructed
a waste water collection ditch along the north edge of his
land to collect excess irrigation water from his fields. This
waste water' was directed easterly through the ditch into
the highway borrow pit where it traveled north for a short
distance along the edge of Franks' land before it again
flowed east under the highway via an underground pipe
constructed by the G.I.D.
In addition to the aforementioned tracts of land farmed
by Fuss, he also farmed on state-lease land which was located
to the north and east across the highway. For over fifteen
years, Fuss used this collected waste water for irrigating
his state-lease land.'
In 1977, Franks applied to the state engineer's office
for a permit for a supplemental supply of water, the source
being the highway borrow pit. The dispute arose when the
Copyright@ 1981 by the University of Wyoming

1. Fuss' land, as used hereafter, refers to both his own property and that
leased by him from Baumgartner.
2. Waste water, as the term is used in this note, refers to excess water flowing
from irrigated lands, either on the surface or seeping under it. For purposes of this note, the terms waste water and seepage water are closely
related and will be used interchangeably. For a discussion of the various
terms commonly used to describe water which has escaped from an appropriator, see HUTCHINS, 2 WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN

STATES 568 (1974) [Hereinafter cited as Hutchins].
8. Record, vol. 1, at 42, Fuss v. Franks, 610 P.2d 17 (Wyo. 1980).
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permit was approved in 1979, at which time Franks constructed a dam in the borrow pit and diverted the waste
water to irrigate his land. Fuss brought action to prevent
Franks from diverting this water and to enjoin further
interference with the use of the water on Fuss' state-lease
land.
The district court, holding that the water from the
highway borrow pit was lawfully appropriated by Franks
under a valid permit, granted Franks' motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the district court's
finding that the appropriation was lawful by holding that
the state engineer had the authority to approve the permit
to appropriate this water.'
4. Fuss v. Franks, 610 P.2d 17 (Wyo. 1980). [Hereinafter cited in the text

as Fusa].
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss1/4
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BACKGROUND

In determining the relative rights of the parties to the
waste water in question, a brief examination of the historical
development of waste water appropriation is helpful. The
Wyoming Constitution declares that (1) the natural waters
within the boundaries of the state are owned by the state,5
and (2) the authority to supervise the waters of the state,
particularly in regard to their appropriation, distribution,
and diversion, is vested in the board of control6 and the state
engineer.' The Wyoming Legislature has not attempted to
go beyond the terms of the state constitution by making any
provisions for the appropriation of waters other than the
natural waters mentioned in article VIII, section 1 of the
Wyoming Constitution.8 These constitutional provisions have
been interpreted to mean that only waters of natural streams
are subject to appropriation.' A natural stream is basically
defined as "[a] channel, consisting of a well defined bed
and banks, and a current of water."'1
An early result of restricting appropriations to waters
of a natural stream was that run-off water intermittently
discharged into an otherwise dry gulch could not be validly
appropriated before it reached a stream," but once waste
water returned to a stream, it became property of the state
and subject to appropriation.'
5.

WYO. CONST. art. 8, § 1 provides: Water is state property.-The water of

all natural streams, springs, lakes, or other collections of still water, within
the boundaries of the state, are hereby declared to be the property of the
state.
6.

7.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

WYO.CONST. art. 8, § 2 provides: Board of Control.-There shall be constituted a board of control, to be composed of the state engineer and super-

intendents of the water divisions; which shall, under such regulations as may
be prescribed by law, have the supervision of the waters of the state and of
their appropriation, distribution, and diversion, and of the various officers
connected therewith. Its decisions to be subject to review by the courts of
the state.
WYo. CONST. art 8, § 5 provides, in part: There shall be a state engineer. ....
He shall be president of the board of control, and shall have general supervision of the waters of the state and of the officers connected with its distribution. No person shall be appointed to this position who has not such
theoretical knowledge and such practical experience and skill as shall fit
him for this position.
State v. Hiber, 48 Wyo. 172, 44 P.2d 1005, 1008 (1935).
Id.
Id. at 1009 quoting 1 KINNEY ON IRRIGATION § 303 (1912).
Id. at 1010.
Wyoming Hereford Ranch v. Hammond Packing Company, 33 Wyo. 14, 236
P. 764, 773 (1925).
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Later, in the case of Binning v. Miller, 8 it was decided
that waste water could be appropriated. A qualifying requirement for this appropriation is that the seepage water
would, if uninterrupted, flow into a natural stream.14 The
court's rationale for this rule was that "seepage water which,
if not intercepted, would naturally reach the stream, is just
as much a part of the stream as the waters of any tributaries."' 5
The case of Bower v. Big Horn Canal Association'6
further illustrated this idea when the court allowed Bower
to intercept and appropriate seepage water flowing on his
land which had been lost from defendant's canal. The seepage
water in question did not form a channel, but was flowing
toward a natural stream.' 7
However, both Binning3 and Bower 9 state that a
seepage water appropriation is subject to the right of the
owner of the land from which the seepage arose to use the
water for beneficial purposes upon the land for which the
water was originally appropriated. In other words, the
lower land owner who appropriates waste water does not
thereby secure a permanent right to continue to receive the
water, he merely takes his chances that the supply will be
kept up."0 If the senior appropriator uses a different method
of irrigation thereby utilizing his water so that he ceases
wasting water, no other appropriator can complain.' The
senior appropriator cannot, however, use the water for a
purpose different than for which it was acquired.22 If the
water was appropriated for irrigation uses, then it can only
be used for that purpose unless the statutory procedure for
change of use is followed."3 Wyoming's current status of the
13. Binning v. Miller, 55 Wyo. 451, 102 P.2d 54 (1940). [Hereinafter cited in
text as Binning].
14. Id. at 61.
15. Id.
16. Bower v. Big Horn Canal Association, 77 Wyo. 80, 307 P.2d 593 (1957).
[Hereinafter cited in text as Bower].
17. Id. at 602.
18. Binning v. Miller, supra note 13, at 61.
19. Bower v. Big Horn Canal Association, supra note 16, at 600.
20. Id. at 601.
21. Id.
22. Wyo. STAT. § 41-3-101 (1977).
23. Wyo. STAT. § 41-3-103 (1977).
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law in the area of waste water recapture and appropriation
rights appears to be in harmony with the general trend of
other western states.2
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

The Wyoming Supreme Court, relying on Bower,"5

stated that:
[T]he owner of land upon which seepage or waste
water rises has the right to use and reuse-capture
and recapture-such waste waters for use only
"upon the land for which the water forming the
seepage was originally appropriated." When the
water leaves the land for which it was appropriated
and would, if left to flow uninterrupted, reach a
natural stream, it becomes eligible to other and
appropriation for other and different
separate
26
uses.
Applying this rule to the facts in Fuss, the court found
that once the water in the collection ditch ran into the highway borrow pit it must be regarded as having escaped the
land to which it was appropriated, and, since there was
testimony that the water would, if uninterrupted, flow into
a natural stream, it becomes eligible for appropriation.2 7
Franks' permit to appropriate this water was, therefore,
held to be valid since Fuss had no superior right to the water
after it left his property. 8
EFFECTS OF THE DECISION

As a result of the court's decision, Fuss could no longer
use this collected waste water on his land east of the highway
since Franks now had a right to the water that entered the
borrow pit. One might be tempted to argue that this holding
is unfavorable from a policy standpoint because it does not
allow an appropriator to reuse his waste water in the most
beneficial way, and thereby does not encourage full utiliza24. See generally HUTCHINS, supra note 2, at 568-579.
25. Bower v. Big Horn Canal Association, supra note 16, at 600.

26. Fuss v. Franks, supra note 4, at 20.
27. Id. at 21.
28. Id.
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tion of irrigation water. To the contrary, both Bower" and
Fusss° were decided with the idea of increasing the use of
irrigation water. In Bower the court stated:
We would certainly discourage development and
retard the full and efficient use of our precious
water supply were we now to say that persons who
save return flows and seepage before they reach
a stream and put the water to beneficial use have
no protection in law, that latecomers who subsequently seek rights from the stream itself can take
the water as against the persons who have put it to
beneficial use for years."
Legal Protection for Waste Water Users
Appropriation of waste water is encouraged by giving
legal protection to those who collect and reuse waste water.
A protection is afforded in two primary regards. First, as
noted before, a prior appropriator who catches excess irrigation water on his land has a superior right to reuse that
water upon that same land." No other appropriator can
compel him to release this water while it is on his land and
he is beneficially using it for further irrigation purposes.3
In fact, a prior appropriator can at anytime, utilize irrigation methods that are totally consumptive, such as pumping
the collected waste water back to the top of the field or
installing a sprinkler system, thereby eliminating all waste
of water.3
Secondly, a person seeking to use his own waste water
upon other lands, can receive an appropriation permit to do
so, thereby securing his right to continue using it in that
manner. The Fusss" case does not say that an appropriator
cannot use waste water upon lands other than those for
which the water was originally appropriated, it merely says
that to do so he must receive a permit. The court recognized
this in Bower when they said:
Bower v. Big Horn Canal Association, supra note 16.
Fuss v. Franks, supra note 4.
Bower v. Big Horn Canal Association, supra note 16, at 602.
Fuss v. Franks, supra note 4, at 20, see also text accompanying note 19,
supra.
33. Bower v. Big Horn Canal Association, aupra note 16, at 601.
34. Id.
85. Fuss v. Franks, supra note 4, at 20.
29.
30.
31.
32.
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77

Additionally, it is equitable, in accordance with
the constitutional provisions of this State, and in
line with our previous holdings, that we here decree
seepage water arising on Bower's land to be subject
to appropriationby him (subject to prescribed procedures) for lands other than those upon which the
seepage arises.36 (Emphasis supplied).
"The 'prescribed procedures' referred to are the application
3
requirements for a water permit under the statutes." The
court in Fuss stated that the rationale for this rule lies in
the historical doctrine that waters become appurtenant to
the lands for which they are acquired and, unless the statutes38 are followed with respect to change of use or place of
use, the waters cannot be detached and assigned to other
land without the loss of priority."
It is submitted that even under the change of use
statute," an appropriator cannot extend his appropriation
to new lands in addition to the land already covered by the
original appropriation. To change the use or place of use
and thereby retain the same priority date as the original
use,41 an appropriator will have to give up part of the
current use since the statute provides that the change shall
not "increase the historic amount consumptively used under
the existing use, nor decrease the historic amount of return
flow .... ,,4 If an appropriator wants to use waste water on
new lands in addition to first using it on the original land,
as Fuss wanted to do, he will, therefore, have to get a new
appropriation for the new lands since the change of use
statutes do not apply to this situation."
If Fuss would have obtained an appropriation permit
to use this water on his land across the highway, he would
have been legally protected to continue doing so as against
36. Bower v. Big Horn Canal Association, supra note 16, at 602.
37. Fuss v. Franks, supra note 4, at 20.
38. WYO. STAT. §§

41-3-103 and 41-3-104 (1977).

39. Scherk v. Nichols, 55 Wyo. 4, 95 P.2d 74 (1939).

§ 41-3-104 (1977).
41. Wyo. STAT. § 41-3-108(b) (1977).
42. WYO. STAT. § 41-3-104 (1977).
40. WYO. STAT.

43. The advantage of effecting a statutory change of use is that the land covered in the change will retain the same priority as the original land, whereas
a new appropriation will receive a new priority date. $ee Wyo. STAT.
§ 41-3-108(b) (1977).
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Franks or any other subsequent appropriator. This legal
protection was available to Fuss, but unfortunately he failed
to invoke it by not applying to the state engineer for a permit
to appropriate the water. Fuss still has the right to reuse
this water upon the land for which it was originally appropriated, but if he allows the water to leave that land, Franks
is now legally entitled to divert and use it.
Salvaged Waters
Fuss claimed that except for the conservation measures
taken by him, the water would not have left his land to
eventually reach a stream, and therefore, would have been*
lost to further beneficial use." In essence, Fuss asserted
that the water in question was salvaged by his conservation
practices, and therefore, he was entitled to some greater
protection-namely, a superior right to use the water on
other lands.
Although a search of Wyoming case law reveals no
cases dealing specifically with salvaged water, a number of
other western states have recognized the concept of salvaged
water and the rights incident thereto." Salvaged waters have
been defined as:
[P]arts of a particular stream or other water
supply that have been lost, as far as any beneficial
use is concerned, to -any of the established users,
but are saved from- further loss from the supply
by artificial
means and so: are made available for
46
use.
Generally, the right to use salvaged water belongs to the
person who makes that water available,47 and the salvagers
rights are superior to all others. 8 "This rule is based upon
the general equity concept that the one who invests time and
funds in such a project is entitled to receive the fruits of his
44. Reply Brief for Appellants at 3, Fuss v. Franks, supra note 4.
note 2, at 565-67.
46. Id. at 565.
47., Id. at 565-66. But see S.E. Clo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms,
48. Inc., 529 P.2d 1321 (Colo: 1975).
48. Basinger v. Taylor, 36 Ida. 591, 211 P. 1085, 1085-86 (1922)
.45. See generally HUTCHINS, supra
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labor."4 A limitation on the use of salvaged water is that
its use must not injure a prior appropriator."
The burden of proof to show that he has, in fact, effected
a savings, is placed upon the party claiming to have salvaged
water.5 In other words, the claimant must demonstrate that
the water salvaged was, prior to the institution of the conservation measures, not otherwise available for appropriation, nor would it have become a part of any stream or
appropriable aquifer.2
If Fuss could have proved that the waste water in
question would not have eventually flowed to a stream,"
by neither surface flow nor seepage to the stream bed, except for his conservation measures, then he should have
been allowed to use this water on new lands without having
to seek a new permit. This result is supported by the implication in Bower" that water that would not eventually reach
a stream (such as salvaged water) is not governed by the
appropriation system and therefore becomes property of the
person who captures and puts it to use.
To encourage conservation of water, truly salvaged
waters should be awarded to the one saving that water, and
the application of those waters to new lands should be
allowed if the claimant can show that he will not injure any
prior rights. This would give an incentive for water saving
measures by rewarding those who institute conservation
practices.
If Fuss could have shown that he was truly salvaging
the waste water, then a superior legal right to that water
might have been granted. However, the court found that this
Company
49. See HUTCHINS, supra note 2, at 566. See also Santa Cruz Reservoir
v. Rameriz, 16 Ariz. 64, 70-71, 141 P. 120 (1914).
50. Hill v. Green, 47 Ida. 157, 274 P. 110, 110-111 (1928).

51. HUTCHINS, supra note 2 at 566.
52.

Comment, Water Saved or Water Lost: The Consequences of Individual
L.
Conservation Measures in the Appropriation States, 11 LAND & WATER
REV. 435, 443-444 (1976).

end of his
53. An example would be where the water accumulated on the lower
fields and evaporated or was lost to the stream system by deep percolation
into underlying bedrock. For a discussion on burden of proof in salvaged
water cases, see Comment, supra note 52, at 435, 443-445.
54. Bower v. Big Horn Canal Association, supra note 16.
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waste water was subject to appropriation because there was
testimony that it would have reached a natural stream.
Therefore, Fuss had no superior right to it once it left the
land for which it was appropriated.55 Since Fuss failed to
get a permit to use this water on new lands, he lost that
rights to a later appropriator (Franks) who did obtain a
permit to appropriate the water.
Jurisdiction
In addition to encouraging full and efficient use of
water, a favorable policy result of declaring waste water
to be subject to appropriation is that it gives the state
engineer and the state board of control jurisdiction and
authority over the appropriation of these waters. The board
of control was created to supervise the water of the State 6
for the purpose of securing its beneficial use.5" Since the
board of control and the state engineer have the necessary
expertise and experience in water matters, they are better
equipped to supervise the appropriation and distribution of
waste waters. 5 Allowing these agencies jurisdiction over
waste water, as well as other natural waters of the state,
enhances a more uniform regulation and accurate public
record of water rights in the state.
Adverse Possession and Use of Water
In Fuss, the Wyoming Supreme Court declined to consider the question of adverse use because the issue was not
presented to the trial court.59 If a water right can arise by
adverse use in Wyoming, Fuss would appear to have had
a good argument that he had acquired a prescriptive right
to use the water since he had been doing so openly and
continuously for fifteen years.6" Of course, he would still
have the burden of providing all of the necessary elements
55. Fuss v. Franks, supra note 4, at 21.
56. WYO. CONST. art. 8, § 2, supra note 6.
57. Thayer v. City of Rawlins, 594 P.2d 951, 958-959 (Wyo. 1979) (dissenting
opinion).
58. Id. at 958-959 (dissenting opinion).
59. Fuss v. Franks, 8upra note 4, at 21. The court stated that "the issue of
adverse use of either the ditch or water was not presented to the trial court
and we will, therefore, not consider the issue here."
60. Record, vol. 1 at 42, Fuss v. Franks, supra note 4.
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of adverse use." The question that needs to be considered is
whether a water right can even arise by an adverse use in
Wyoming.
A number of western states have statutory provisions
or reported court decisions that deal directly with the issue
of whether prescriptive water rights can be acquired by adverse possession." Wyoming, however, does not have a statute
regarding adverse use of water, nor has the supreme court
directly answered the question of whether prescriptive title
to water can be obtained.
In Campbell v. Wyoming Development Company" the
court discussed the elements necessary for a prescriptive
title to water. A prescriptive right was denied because the
evidence failed to show that plaintiff's possession was
"actual, open, hostile, exclusive and continuous for
the
period prescribed by the statute." 4 The court then said:
We do not mean to intimate, or seem to concur in
the view, that a prescriptive title to water may be
acquired in this state, particularly since 1890, when
the legislature enacted a law requiring the initiation of all water rights to be pursuant to a permit
from the State Engineer. We do not need to enter
into that question in this case. 5
In denying petition for rehearing in the Campbell case,
the court indicated that mere use of water, however long
continued, did not give rise to a title by prescription; claimants must also show a substantial invasion of the lawful
owner's rights and its extent during a continuous prescriptive period. 6 The court declined to add anything further
to its original opinion concerning the refusal to grant the
prescriptive right in view of the facts of the case, but did
61. Campbell v. Wyoming Development Company, 55 Wyo. 347, 100 P.2d 124,
139 (1940), reh. denied, 102 P.2d 745 (1940).
62. HUTCHINS, supra note 2 at 381-382 and 404 n. 776. In addition to those
statutes and court decisions, legislation or court decisions in some states
have specifically limited the acquisition of prescription as against water or
water rights held by the state, United States, or other public entities.
63. Campbell v. Wyoming Development Company, supra note 61. [Hereinafter
cited in text as Campbell].
64. Id. at 139.
65. Id.
66. Id. at reh. denied 102 P.2d 745 (Wyo. 1940).
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as to prescription ...

[is] if a prescriptive title may be obtained at all in this state,
which we refused to decide." 7
The issue arose in a subsequent case,"8 but again the
question was not settled, as the court did not discuss whether
a precriptive right could be acquired after the enactment of
the 1890 water rights statute. 9 The court merely said that
use of water, standing alone, does not give rise to a title
by prescription."
If the issue had been presented at a full trial on the
merits, and Fuss' use satisfied the elements necessary for
a precriptive right, it seems doubtful that a prescriptive
title to the water would have been allowed in light of the
fact that one has never been obtained in this state since the
enactment of the 1890 water rights statute. However, until
the legislature or the court directly decides the issue, it
remains an open question.
CONCLUSION

Recaptured waste water provides a significant source
of water for further irrigation purposes since nearly every
irrigation project eventually becomes a drainage project.7
Waste water can be a valuable supplement to an individual's
existing water supply. Reuse of this water is of increasing
importance as streams become fully appropriated. 2
The Fuss decision emphasizes the strong support given
to the appropriation system by not allowing it to become
eroded by exceptions. Moreover, this case stands as a warning to appropriators who collect waste water and use it on
other land without seeking a new appropriation permit.
Using recaptured waste water on new land requires the
appropriator to get a new permit or risk losing that use to
67. Id.
68. Hunziker v. Knowlton, 78 Wyo. 241, 822 P.2d 141 (1958).
69. WYO..STAT. §§ 41-4-501 through 41-4-506 and 41-4-517 (1977).
70. Hunziker v. Knowlton, supra note 68, at 145.
71. TRELEASE, WATER LAW 240 (3rd ed. 1979)*
72. Trelease, Reclamation Water Rights, 32 ROCKY MT. L .REv. 464, 469-470
(1960).
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83

a later appropriator. Here, as could happen in many other
instances, a waste water use enjoyed for many years was
lost as a result of a failure to apply for a permit to appropriate.
RICK A. THOMPSON
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